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Abstract—In this paper, we consider decode-and-forward (DF)
relay beamforming with imperfect channel state information
(CSI), cooperative artificial noise (AN) injection, and finite-
alphabet input in the presence of an user and J non-colluding
eavesdroppers. The communication between the source and the
user is aided by a multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) DF
relay. We use the fact that a wiretap code consists of two parts:
i) common message (non-secret), and ii) secret message. The
source transmits two independent messages: i) common message
(non-secret), and ii) secret message. The common message is
transmitted at a fixed rate R0, and it is intended for the user.
The secret message is also intended for the user but it should be
kept secret from the J eavesdroppers. The source and the MIMO
DF relay operate under individual power constraints. In order to
improve the secrecy rate, the MIMO relay also injects artificial
noise. The CSI on all the links are assumed to be imperfect
and CSI errors are assumed to be norm bounded. In order to
maximize the worst case secrecy rate, we maximize the worst
case link information rate to the user subject to: i) the individual
power constraints on the source and the MIMO relay, and ii) the
best case link information rates to J eavesdroppers be less than
or equal to R0 in order to support a fixed common message rate
R0. Numerical results showing the effect of perfect/imperfect CSI,
presence/absence of AN with finite-alphabet input on the secrecy
rate are presented.
keywords: MIMO relay beamforming, physical layer security, multiple
eavesdroppers, artificial noise, imperfect CSI, finite-alphabet input, semi-
definite programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
The physically degraded discrete memoryless wiretap chan-
nel model considered by Wyner in [1] opened the path for
reliable and secure information transmission using physical
layer techniques. Subsequent extension to discrete memory-
less broadcast channel and Gaussian channel was done in
[2] and [3], respectively. A wireless network can be easily
eavesdropped due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmis-
sion. However, using physical layer techniques (e.g. wiretap
codes, beamforming using multiple antennas, artificial noise
injection etc.), a wireless network can be secured from getting
eavesdropped. Achievable secrecy rate and capacity in single
and multiple antenna wiretap channels have been reported by
many authors, e.g., [4]–[9].
A relay, operating in decode-and-forward (DF) or amplify-
and-forward (AF) mode, can act as an intermediate node
and help improving the secrecy rate [10]. DF and AF relay
beamforming techniques for secrecy under perfect/imperfect
channel state information (CSI) have been well studied in the
This work was supported in part by the Indo-French Centre for Applied
Mathematics.
literature, e.g. [11]–[16]. In these works, the transmit code-
word symbols belong to an infinite constellation (Gaussian).
However, in a practical communication system, the codeword
symbols will belong to a finite alphabet set, e.g., M -ary
alphabets. The effect of finite constellation on secrecy rate has
been reported in [17]–[23]. In [22], DF relay beamforming for
secrecy with finite alphabet has been considered. There it was
shown that when the source power and relay beamforming
vector obtained for Gaussian alphabet, when used with finite
alphabet, could lead to zero secrecy rate. A power control
algorithm was suggested to alleviate the loss in secrecy rate.
Motivated by the above works, in this paper, we consider
secrecy rate in DF relay beamforming with finite-alphabet
input using a MIMO relay. The considered system consists of
a source node, a destination node, and multiple non-colluding
eavesdroppers. A DF MIMO relay aids the communication
between the source and destination. It is known that secrecy
rate can be improved through the use of artificial noise (AN)
injection [8], [11], [24], [25], [26], [16]. In this work, we
allow the MIMO relay to inject AN in addition to relaying
the information symbol from the source. Consequently, we
solve for both the optimum source power, signal beamforming
weights as well as the AN covariance matrix at the MIMO
relay. Since the CSI will not be perfect in practice, we consider
a norm-bounded CSI error model and investigate the effect
of imperfect CSI on the secrecy rate. We use the fact that
a wiretap code consists of two parts: i) common message
(non-secret), and ii) secret message. The source transmits two
independent messages: i) common message (non-secret), and
ii) secret message. The common message is transmitted at a
fixed rate R0, and its intended for the destination node. The
secret message is also intended for the destination node but
it should be kept secret from J eavesdroppers. The source
and the MIMO DF relay operate under individual power
constraints. In order to maximize the worst case secrecy rate,
we maximize the worst case link information rate to the user
subject to: i) the individual power constraints on the source
and the MIMO DF relay, and ii) the best case link information
rates to J eavesdroppers be less than or equal to R0 in order to
support a fixed common message rate R0. Numerical results
showing the effect of perfect/imperfect CSI, presence/absence
of AN with finite-alphabet input on the secrecy rate are
presented.
Notations : A ∈ CN1×N2 implies that A is a complex
matrix of dimension N1 × N2. A  0 and A ≻ 0 imply
that A is a positive semidefinite matrix and positive definite
matrix, respectively. Identity matrix is denoted by I . Transpose
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Fig. 1. System model for MIMO DF relaying.
and complex conjugate transpose operations are denoted by
[.]T and [.]∗, respectively. E[.] denotes expectation operator.
‖.‖ denotes 2-norm operator. Trace of matrix A ∈ CN×N is
denoted by Tr(A). ψ ∈ CN×1 ∼ CN (0,Ψ) implies that ψ is
a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vector with
mean vector 0 and covariance matrix Ψ.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a DF cooperative relaying scheme which consists
of a source node S having single transmit antenna, a MIMO
DF relay node R having N receive/transmit antennas, a
destination node D having single receive antenna, and J non-
colluding eavesdropper nodes E1, E2, · · · , EJ having single
receive antenna each. The system model is shown in Fig. 1.
In addition to the links from relay to destination node and
relay to eavesdropper nodes, we assume direct links from
source to destination node and source to eavesdropper nodes.
The complex channel gain vector between the source and the
relay is denoted by g = [g1, g2, · · · , gN ]T ∈ CN×1. Likewise,
the channel gain vector between the relay and the destination
node D is denoted by h = [h1, h2, · · · , hN ] ∈ C1×N , and the
channel gain vector between the relay and the jth eavesdropper
node Ej , 1 ≤ j ≤ J , is denoted by zj = [z1j, z2j , · · · , zNj ] ∈
C1×N . The channel gains on the direct links from the source to
D and the source to Ej are denoted by h0 and z0j , respectively.
The MIMO relay operates in half duplex mode, and
the communication happens in two hops. Each hop is di-
vided into n channel uses. We use the fact that a wire-
tap code consists of two parts: i) common message (non-
secret), and ii) secret message. In the first hop of trans-
mission, the source S transmits two independent messages
W0 and W1 which are equiprobable over {1, 2, · · · , 22nR0}
and {1, 2, · · · , 22nRs(R0)}, respectively. W0 is the common
message which is transmitted at a fixed rate R0 and its
intended for the destination D. W1 is a secret message which
is transmitted at some rate Rs(R0) and its also intended
only for D and it should be kept secret from all Ejs. For
each W0 and W1 drawn independently and equiprobably
from the sets {1, 2, · · · , 22nR0} and {1, 2, · · · , 22nRs(R0)},
respectively, the source S maps W0 and W1 to a codeword
{xm}nm=1 of length n. Each symbol, xm, in the codeword is
independent and equiprobable over a complex finite-alphabet
set A = {a1, a2, · · · , aM} of size M with E[xm] = 0, and
E[|xm|2] = 1. The source is constrained by the available power
PS and it transmits the weighted symbol which is
√
Psxm in
the mth channel use, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n, and 0 ≤ Ps ≤ PS .
Hereafter, we will denote the symbol xm of the codeword
{xm}nm=1 by x, and we will consider only one channel use.
Let yR, yD, and yE1j denote the received signals at the
MIMO relay R, destination D, and jth eavesdropper Ej ,
respectively, in the first hop. We have
yR =
√
Psgx + ηR, (1)
yD1 =
√
Psh0x + ηD1 , (2)
yE1j =
√
Psz0jx + ηE1j , (3)
where ηR(∼ CN (0, N0I)), ηD1(∼ CN (0, N0)), and ηE1j (∼
CN (0, N0)) are receiver noise components and are assumed
to be independent.
In the second hop of transmission, MIMO relay applies
the complex weight φ = [φ1, φ2, · · · , φN ]T ∈ CN×1 on the
successfully decoded symbol x and retransmits it. In order to
improve the secrecy rate, MIMO relay also injects the artificial
noise ψ ∈ CN×1(∼ CN (0,Ψ)). The symbol transmitted by
the MIMO relay on the ith, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , antenna is φix+ ψi.
Let yD2 , and yE2j denote the received signals at the destination
D, and jth eavesdropper Ej , respectively, in the second hop.
We have
yD2 = hφx + hψ + ηD2 , (4)
yE2j = zjφx + zjψ + ηE2j , (5)
where ηD2(∼ CN (0, N0)), and ηE2j (∼ CN (0, N0)) are re-
ceiver noise components and are assumed to be independent.
Using (2), (4), and (3), (5), we rewrite the received signals at
D and Ej in the following vector forms, respectively:
yD = [yD1 , yD2 ]
T
= [
√
Psh0, hφ]
T
x + [ηD1 , hψ + ηD2 ]
T , (6)
yEj = [yE1j , yE2j ]
T
= [
√
Psz0j , zjφ]
T
x + [ηE1j , zjψ + ηE2j ]
T
.(7)
We assume that the MIMO relay’s transmit power, denoted
by Pr, is constrained by the available power PR. This implies
that
Pr = E{‖(φx+ψ)‖2}
= ‖φ‖2 + Tr(Ψ) ≤ PR. (8)
We also assume that the channel remains static over the
entire codeword transmit duration. Further, denoting the secret
message decoded at the MIMO relay R and destination D by
ŴR1 and ŴD1 , respectively, the reliability constraints at R and
D and the perfect secrecy constraints at Ejs are as follows:
Pr(ŴR1 6= W1) ≤ ǫn, Pr(ŴD1 6= W1) ≤ ǫn,
1
2n
I(W1;y
2n
Ej
) ≤ ǫn, ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,
3where y2nEj is the received signal vector at Ej in 2n channel
uses, and ǫn → 0 as n→∞. We also note that the reliability
constraints at the MIMO relay R and destination D for the
secret message also ensure the reliability of the common
message.
III. DF RELAY BEAMFORMING - PERFECT CSI
In this section, we assume that the CSI on all the links are
known perfectly. Using (1), (6), and (7), we get the S-R, S-D,
and S-Ej link information rates, respectively, as follows:
1
2
I(x;yR) =
1
2
I
(
Ps‖g‖2
N0
)
, (9)
1
2
I(x;yD) =
1
2
I
(
Ps|h0|2
N0
+
hφφ∗h∗
N0 + hΨh
∗
)
, (10)
1
2
I(x;yEj ) =
1
2
I
(
Ps|z0j |2
N0
+
zjφφ
∗z∗j
N0 + zjΨz∗j
)
, (11)
where
I(ρ)
△
=
1
M
M∑
l=1
∫
pn
(
y −√ρal
)
log2
pn(y −√ρal)
1
M
M∑
m=1
pn(y −√ρam)
dy, (12)
and pn(θ) = 1π e
−|θ|2
. The factor 1/2 in (9), (10), and (11)
is due to two hops. Further, the MIMO relay R will be able
to decode the symbol x if the following condition holds true
[11,15,16,22]:
1
2
I(x;yR) ≥
1
2
I(x;yD). (13)
In order to find the maximum achievable secrecy rate Rs(R0)
which also supports the fixed common message rate R0, we
maximize the S−D link information rate subject to i) S−Ej ,
1 ≤ j ≤ J , link information rates be less than or equal to R0,
ii) the information rate constraint in (13), and iii) the power
constraints. The optimization problem is as follows:
RD(R0) = max
Ps, φ, Ψ
1
2
I(x;yD) (14)
s.t.
1
2
I(x;yEj ) ≤ R0, ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, (15)
1
2
I(x;yR) ≥
1
2
I(x;yD), (16)
0 ≤ Ps ≤ PS , Ψ  0, ‖φ‖2 + Tr(Ψ) ≤ PR. (17)
Having obtained RD(R0) from (14), the maximum achievable
secrecy rate Rs(R0) for a given common message rate R0 is
[9]
Rs(R0) = {RD(R0)−R0}+, (18)
where {α}+ = max(0, α). From the constraint in (16), its
obvious that the upper bound for S−D link information rate,
denoted by RD, can be obtained by evaluating (9) at Ps = PS .
For the values of R0 over the interval [0, RD], the maximum
achievable secrecy rate, denoted by Rs, is obtained as follows:
Rs = max
0 ≤ R0 ≤ RD
{RD(R0)−R0}+ (19)
= max
0 ≤ l ≤ L
{RD(l∆1)− l∆1}+, (20)
where L is a large positive integer, ∆1 = RD/L, l is an
integer, and R0 = l∆1.
We solve the optimization problem (14) for a fixed Ps =
k∆2, where ∆2 = PS/K , K is a large positive integer,
and 1 ≤ k ≤ K . Hereafter, we will assume that Ps is
known. Further, it is shown in [27,28] that for various M -ary
alphabets, mutual information expression in (12) is a strictly
increasing concave function in SNR. With this fact, we rewrite
the optimization problem (14) into the following equivalent
form:
max
Φ, Ψ
(
a+
hΦh∗
N0 + hΨh
∗
)
(21)
s.t. ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,(
bj +
zjΦz
∗
j
N0 + zjΨz∗j
)
≤ I−1(2R0), (22)
c ≥
(
a+
hΦh∗
N0 + hΨh
∗
)
(23)
Φ  0, rank(Φ) = 1, Ψ  0, Tr(Φ+Ψ) ≤ PR, (24)
where Φ = φφ∗, a =
(
Ps|h0|
2
N0
)
, bj =
(Ps|z0j |2
N0
)
, and
c =
(
Ps‖g‖
2
N0
)
. Further, relaxing the rank(Φ) = 1 constraint,
we rewrite the above optimization problem into the following
form:
max
t, Φ, Ψ
t (25)
s.t. (t− a)(N0 + hΨh∗)− (hΦh∗) ≤ 0, (26)
∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,(
zjΦz
∗
j
)− (I−1(2R0)− bj)(N0 + zjΨz∗j ) ≤ 0, (27)
(hΦh∗)− (c− a)(N0 + hΨh∗) ≤ 0, (28)
Φ  0, Ψ  0, Tr(Φ+Ψ) ≤ PR. (29)
The above problem can be easily solved using bisection
method [29]. The initial search interval in the bisection method
can be taken as [0, c]. In the appendix, we show that the
solution Φ of the above problem has rank 1. Further, denoting
the maximum value of t by tmax, the secrecy rate is obtained
as follows:
Rs(R0) =
{
1
2
I(tmax)−R0
}+
. (30)
IV. DF RELAY BEAMFORMING - IMPERFECT CSI
In this section, we assume that each receiver has perfect
knowledge of its CSI. We also assume that the control unit
which computes the source power, signal beamforming vector
and AN covariance matrix has imperfect CSI on all links. The
imperfection in CSI is modeled as follows [15,25,26]:
g = ĝ + eg , h0 = ĥ0 + eh0 , h = ĥ+ eh,
∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, z0j = ẑ0j + ez0j , zj = ẑj + ezj , (31)
4where ĝ, ĥ0, ĥ, ẑ0j , ẑj are the available CSI estimates, and
eg, eh0 , eh, ez0j , ezj are the corresponding CSI errors. We
assume that the CSI errors are bounded, i.e.,
‖eg‖≤ ǫg, |eh0 | ≤ ǫh0 , ‖eh‖≤ ǫh,
∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, |ez0j | ≤ ǫz0j , ‖ezj‖≤ ǫzj . (32)
With the above CSI error model, we write the rank relaxed
optimization problem (21) as follows:
max
Φ, Ψ
min
eh
(
aN0 + (ĥ+ eh)
(
aΨ+Φ
)
(ĥ+ eh)
∗
N0 + (ĥ + eh)Ψ(ĥ + eh)∗
)
(33)
s.t. ‖eh‖
2 ≤ ǫ2h, (34)

∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,
max
ezj
(
bjN0+(ẑj+ezj )
(
bjΨ+Φ
)
(ẑj+ezj )
∗
N0+(ẑj+ezj )Ψ(ẑj+ezj )
∗
)
≤ I−1(2R0),
s.t. ‖ezj‖
2 ≤ ǫ2zj ,


(35)
{
c ≥ max
eh
(
amax +
(ĥ+eh)Φ(ĥ+eh)
∗
N0+(ĥ+eh)Ψ(ĥ+eh)
∗
)
s.t. ‖eh‖
2 ≤ ǫ2h,
}
(36)
Φ  0, Ψ  0, Tr(Φ+Ψ) ≤ PR, (37)
where
a =
(Ps||ĥ0| − ǫh0 |2
N0
)
if (|ĥ0| > ǫh0), 0 else, (38)
bj =
(Ps||ẑ0j |+ ǫz0j |2
N0
)
, (39)
c =
(Ps| ‖ĝ‖ −ǫg|2
N0
)
if (‖ĝ‖> ǫg), 0 else, (40)
amax =
(Ps||ĥ0|+ ǫh0 |2
N0
)
. (41)
The objective function in (33) corresponds to the worst case
S − D link information rate over the region of CSI error
uncertainty. The constraint in (35) corresponds to the best
case S − Ej link information rate over the region of CSI
error uncertainty. The constraint in (36) is associated with
the information rate constraint in (23), i.e., the worst case
information rate to the MIMO relay R over the region of CSI
error uncertainty should be greater than or equal to the best
case information rate to destination D.
Solving the optimization problem (33) is hard due to the
presence of eh in both the numerator and denominator of
the objective function in (33) and the constraint in (36).
Similarly, ezj appears in both the numerator and denominator
of the constraint in (35). So, by independently constraining the
various quadratic terms appearing in the objective function in
(33) and the constraints in (35), (36), we get the following
lower bound for the above optimization problem:
max
Φ, Ψ,
r1, r2, r3, r4,
s1j , s2j , j=1,2,··· ,J
r1
r2
(42)
s.t. Φ  0, Ψ  0, Tr(Φ+Ψ) ≤ PR, (43)
∀eh s.t. ‖eh‖2 ≤ ǫ2h =⇒
0 ≤ r1 ≤ aN0 + (ĥ+ eh)
(
aΨ+Φ
)
(ĥ+ eh)
∗, (44)
∀eh s.t. ‖eh‖2 ≤ ǫ2h =⇒
N0 + (ĥ+ eh)Ψ(ĥ+ eh)
∗ ≤ r2, (45)
s1j
s2j
≤ I−1(2R0), ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J (46)
∀ezj s.t. ‖ezj‖2 ≤ ǫ2zj =⇒
bjN0 + (ẑj + ezj )
(
bjΨ+Φ
)
(ẑj + ezj )
∗ ≤ s1j , (47)
∀ezj s.t. ‖ezj‖2 ≤ ǫ2zj =⇒
0 ≤ s2j ≤ N0 + (ẑj + ezj )Ψ(ẑj + ezj )∗, (48)
c ≥
(
amax +
r3
r4
)
, (49)
∀eh s.t. ‖eh‖2 ≤ ǫ2h =⇒
(ĥ+ eh)Φ(ĥ+ eh)
∗ ≤ r3, (50)
∀eh s.t. ‖eh‖2 ≤ ǫ2h =⇒
0 ≤ r4 ≤ N0 + (ĥ+ eh)Ψ(ĥ+ eh)∗. (51)
The quadratic inequality constraints in (44) and (45) are
associated with the objective function in (33). The constraint
in (46), and the quadratic inequality constraints in (47) and
(48) are associated with the constraint in (35). Similarly, the
constraint in (49), and the quadratic inequality constraints in
(50) and (51) are associated with the constraint in (36).
Further, using S-procedure [29], we transform the quadratic
inequality constraints in (44), (45), (47), (48), (50), and
(51), into the following linear matrix inequality (LMI) forms,
respectively:
r1 ≥ 0, λ1 ≥ 0,A1
△
=[ (
aΨ + Φ
)
+ λ1I
(
aΨ + Φ
)
ĥ
∗
ĥ
(
aΨ + Φ
)
∗
aN0 + ĥ
(
aΨ + Φ
)
ĥ
∗
− r1 − λ1ǫ
2
h
]
,
λ2 ≥ 0, A2
△
=[
−Ψ + λ2I −Ψĥ
∗
−ĥΨ∗ −N0 − ĥΨĥ
∗
+ r2 − λ2ǫ
2
h
]
,
µ1j ≥ 0, B1j
△
=[
−
(
bjΨ + Φ
)
+ µ1jI −
(
bjΨ + Φ
)
ẑ∗j
−ẑj
(
bjΨ + Φ
)
∗ −bjN0 − ẑj
(
bjΨ + Φ
)
ẑ∗j + s1j − µ1jǫ
2
zj
]
,
s2j ≥ 0, µ2j ≥ 0, B2j
△
=[
Ψ + µ2jI Ψẑ
∗
j
ẑjΨ
∗ N0 + ẑjΨẑ
∗
j − s2j − µ2jǫ
2
zj
]
,
λ3 ≥ 0, A3
△
=[
−Φ + λ3I −Φĥ
∗
−ĥΦ∗ −ĥΦĥ
∗
+ r3 − λ3ǫ
2
h
]
,
r4 ≥ 0, λ4 ≥ 0, A4
△
=[
Ψ + λ4I Ψĥ
∗
ĥΨ∗ N0 + ĥΨĥ
∗
− r4 − λ4ǫ
2
h
]
,
where A1  0, A2  0, A3  0, A4  0, B1j  0,
B2j  0. We substitute the above LMI constraints in the
optimization problem (42). We get the following equivalent
form for the optimization problem (42):
5max
Φ, Ψ,
r1,···r4, λ1,··· ,λ4,
s1j , s2j , µ1j , µ2j , j=1,2,··· ,J,
r
r (52)
s.t. Φ  0, Ψ  0, Tr(Φ+Ψ) ≤ PR,
rr2 − r1 ≤ 0, ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, s1j − s2jI
−1(2R0) ≤ 0,
r1 ≥ 0, r4 ≥ 0, λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0, λ4 ≥ 0,
A1  0, A2  0, A3  0, A4  0,
s2j ≥ 0, µ1j ≥ 0, µ2j ≥ 0, B1j  0, B2j  0,
r3 − (c− amax)r4 ≤ 0. (53)
The above problem can be solved using the bisection method
as discussed in Section III. The initial search interval in the
bisection method can be taken as [0, c], where c is as defined
in (40). Further, denoting the maximum value of r by rmax,
the lower bound on the secrecy rate is obtained as follows:
Rs(R0) ≥
{
1
2
I(rmax)−R0
}+
. (54)
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present numerical results on the secrecy
rate for BPSK alphabet (i.e., M = 2), with/without AN,
perfect/imperfect CSI conditions. We assume that N = 2,
J = 1, 2, 3, N0 = 1, Ps = 0 dB, and PR = 9 dB.
Perfect CSI case of Section III : We have used the following
channel gains in the simulations:
g = [−0.5839 + 2.2907i,−0.7158+ 0.1144i]T , (55)
h0 = −0.3822− 0.3976i, (56)
z01 = 0.0123 + 0.0137i, (57)
z02 = 0.0231− 0.0178i, (58)
z03 = −0.0045− 0.0042i, (59)
h = [0.2174− 0.6913i, −0.4047− 0.3159i], (60)
z1 = [0.3826 + 0.0811i, 0.8389− 0.0943i], (61)
z2 = [0.2977 + 0.7902i, −0.2069 + 0.4696i], (62)
z3 = [−0.6076 + 0.6637i, −0.3316+ 0.1921i]. (63)
In Fig. 2, we plot the secrecy rate versus R0 for BPSK alphabet
(i.e., M = 2), with/without AN, J = 1, 2, 3 eavesdroppers,
Ps = 0 dB, and PR = 9 dB. We observe that the secrecy rate
initially increases with increase in R0 and then drops to zero
for large values of R0. We also observe that the injection of
AN improves the secrecy rate when J = 2, 3 eavesdroppers
are present. However, when only one eavesdropper is present,
the secrecy rate plots with/without AN overlap. This is due
to the null signal beamforming by the MIMO relay at the
eavesdropper. This is possible only when the number of
eavesdroppers is strictly less than the number of antennas
in the MIMO relay which happens to be true for this case
with N = 2 and J = 1. For the case when J = 1, the
secrecy rate maximum happens at R0 = 0.001445. Further,
for the case when J = 2, 3 and without AN, the secrecy
rate maximum happens at R0 = 0.145797, and with AN it
happens at R0 = 0.080959 and R0 = 0.099059, respectively.
It is seen that the secrecy rate falls approximately linearly for
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Fig. 2. Secrecy rate vs R0 in MIMO DF relay beamforming for BPSK
alphabet, with/without AN signal. N = 2, N0 = 1, J = 1, 2, 3, M = 2,
fixed Ps = 0 dB, and PR = 9 dB.
large R0. The near-linear fall in secrecy rate for large values
of R0 is due to the saturation of S−D link information rate to
1
2 log2 2 = 0.5 for M = 2. We have also numerically observed
that the rank of Φ is 1.
Imperfect CSI case of Section IV : Here, we assume that
the channel gains in (55)-(63) are the available CSI estimates.
We also assume that the magnitudes of the CSI errors in all
the links are equal, i.e., ǫg = ǫh0 = ǫz0j = ǫh = ǫzj = ǫ.
We solve the optimization problem (52) for BPSK alphabet
(i.e., M = 2), with AN, fixed R0 = 0.0810, Ps = 0 dB, and
PR = 9 dB. In Fig. 3, we plot Rs vs ǫ with AN for J = 1, 2, 3.
We observe that the secrecy rate decreases with increase in CSI
error and with increase in number of eavesdroppers. We have
also numerically observed that the rank of Φ is 1.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We considered MIMO DF relay beamforming with im-
perfect CSI, cooperative artificial noise injection, and finite-
alphabet input in the presence of an user and multiple non-
colluding eavesdroppers. The source transmits common and
secret messages which are intended for the user. The common
message is transmitted at a fixed rate R0. In order to maximize
the worst case secrecy rate, we maximized the worst case link
information rate to the user subject to: i) the individual power
constraints on the source and the MIMO DF relay, and ii)
the best case link information rates to J eavesdroppers be
less than or equal to R0 in order to support a fixed common
message rate R0. Numerical results showing the effect of
perfect/imperfect CSI, presence/absence of AN with finite-
alphabet input on the secrecy rate were presented. We would
like to remark that the work presented in this paper can be
extended to amplify-and-forward relay channel.
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Fig. 3. Rs vs ǫ in MIMO DF relay beamforming for BPSK alphabet and
with AN signal. N = 2, N0 = 1, J = 1, 2, 3, M = 2, fixed R0 = 0.0810,
Ps = 0 dB, and PR = 9 dB.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we analyze the rank of the optimal solution
Φ obtained from the optimization problem (25). We take the
Lagrangian of the objective function −t with constraints in
(26)-(29) as follows [29]:
ℓ(t, Φ, Ψ, λ, Λ1, Λ2, µ, νj , ξ) = −t− Tr(Λ1Φ)
−Tr(Λ2Ψ) + λ
(
Tr(Φ) + Tr(Ψ)− PR
)
+µ
(
(t− a)(N0 + hΨh∗)− (hΦh∗))
+
J∑
j=1
νj
((
zjΦz
∗
j
)− (I−1(2R0)− bj)(N0 + zjΨz∗j ))
+ξ
(
(hΦh∗)− (c− a)(N0 + hΨh∗)) (64)
where λ ≥ 0, Λ1  0, Λ2  0, µ ≥ 0, νj ≥ 0, ξ ≥ 0 are
Lagrangian multipliers. The KKT conditions for (64) are as
follows:
(a1) all constraints in (26)-(29),
(a2) Tr(Λ1Φ) = 0. Since Λ1  0 and Φ  0 =⇒ Λ1Φ =
0,
(a3) Tr(Λ2Ψ) = 0. Since Λ2  0 and Ψ  0 =⇒ Λ2Ψ =
0,
(a4) λ
(
Tr(Φ) + Tr(Ψ)− PR
)
= 0,
(a5) µ
(
(t− a)(N0 + hΨh∗)− (hΦh∗)) = 0,
(a6) ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, νj
((
zjΦz
∗
j
)−(I−1(2R0)−bj)(N0+
zjΨz
∗
j )
)
= 0,
(a7) ξ
(
(hΦh∗)− (c− a)(N0 + hΨh∗)) = 0,
(a8) ∂ℓ
∂t
= 0 =⇒ µ(N0 + hΨh∗) = 1. This further implies
that µ > 0,
(a9) ∂ℓ
∂Φ
= 0 =⇒ Λ1 = λI − µ(h∗h) +
∑J
j=1 νj(z
∗
jzj) +
ξ(h∗h),
(a10) ∂ℓ
∂Ψ
= 0 =⇒ Λ2 = λI + µ(t − a)(h∗h) −∑J
j=1 νj
(
I−1(2R0)− bj
)
(z∗jzj)− ξ(c− a)(h∗h).
The KKT conditions (a8) and (a5) imply that the constraint
(26) will be satisfied with equality. Assuming Φ 6= 0, this
further implies that t > a. The constraints (27) and (28) imply
that I−1(2R0) ≥ bj and c > a. The KKT conditions (a9),
(a10), (a2), (a3), (a4), (a5), (a6), and (a7) imply that
λPR − µ(t− a)N0 +
J∑
j=1
νj
(
I−1(2R0)− bj
)
N0
+ξ(c− a)N0 = 0. (65)
Let PR be small enough such that the constraint in (28) is
satisfied with strict inequality. This implies that the KKT
condition (a7) will be satisfied only when ξ = 0. With ξ = 0,
we consider the scenario when the expression (65) is satisfied
for λ > 0. With λ > 0, the KKT condition (a4) implies that
Tr(Φ)+Tr(Ψ) = PR, i.e., the entire relay power, PR, will be
used for transmission. Further, we rewrite the KKT condition
(a9) as follows:
Λ1 + µ(h
∗h) = λI +
J∑
j=1
νj(z
∗
jzj) ≻ 0. (66)
The above expression implies that rank
(
Λ1) ≥ N −
rank
(
µ(h∗h)
)
= N − 1. The KKT condition (a2) further
implies that rank
(
Λ1) = N − 1 and rank
(
Φ) = 1.
We now show that the solution Φ of the optimization
problem (25) has rank-1 even for large values of PR. Let
Φ 6= 0 ( 0) and Ψ 6= 0 ( 0) be the optimal solutions
of (25) with
Tr(Φ) + Tr(Ψ) = P ≤ PR,
and the objective function value t > 0. Define
Φ0 =
Φ
Tr(Φ) + Tr(Ψ)
=
Φ
P
,
Ψ0 =
Ψ
Tr(Φ) + Tr(Ψ)
=
Ψ
P
.
It is obvious that the objective function value, t, in the opti-
mization problem (25) is a non-decreasing function in PR. As
discussed previously for small values of PR, the optimization
problem (25) attains it’s maximum value when entire power is
used, i.e., (Φ, Ψ) = (PΦ0, PΨ0) = (PRΦ0, PRΨ0). This
implies that the objective function value, t, in (25) is a strictly
increasing function in PR for small values of PR. We now
fix the directional matrices (Φ0, Ψ0) which are obtained for
small values of PR such that the constraint in (28) is satisfied
with strict inequality. We rewrite the constraints in (27) and
(28) in the following forms, respectively:
7∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, I−1(2R0) ≥
(
bj +
zjΦz
∗
j
N0 + zjΨz∗j
)
, (67)
c ≥
(
a+
hΦh
∗
N0 + hΨh
∗
)
. (68)
In the above inequalities, the derivatives of the functions
(
zjΦz
∗
j
N0+zjΨz∗j
) and ( hΦh
∗
N0+hΨh∗
) w.r.t. P when evaluated at
(PΦ0, PΨ0) are ≥ 0 and > 0, respectively. This implies
that the right hand sides of the inequalities in (67) and (68)
are non-decreasing and strictly increasing functions in P ,
respectively, at (PΦ0, PΨ0). This further implies that if
the above inequalities are satisfied at (PRΦ0, PRΨ0), the
optimization problem (25) will attain its maximum value at
(PRΦ0, PRΨ0), i.e., when the entire available relay power,
PR, is used. When PR is large such that the above inequalities
fail to satisfy at (PRΦ0, PRΨ0), the optimization problem
(25) will attain its maximum value at (PΦ0, PΨ0), where
P (< PR) is the maximum power at which the above
inequalities are satisfied at (PΦ0, PΨ0). The excess power
(PR − P ) will remain unused. This implies that the ranks of
Φ and Ψ remain constant for large values of PR.
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